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I. INTRODUCTION
A man is visiting with friends and family at his sister's home.' The
next door neighbor is gone for the night, but the neighbor's teenage
daughter is home having a party, serving alcohol to other minors. The
man goes outside to check on his truck, and three of the partygoers con-
3
front him. He is punched in the face, knocked to the pavement, and as a
t J.D. Candidate, 2000, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., University of
Minnesota, 1996.
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result of head injuries, ultimately suffers short-term memory, balance, vi-
sion, hearing, and sense of smell deficiencies; treatment expenses exceed
$100,00.4 His plans to one day manage the family-owned business are
destroyed; a rehabilitation expert concludes he no longer is capable of
5
that job. He is an innocent victim who has suffered extensive damages.
Unfortunately for him, the teenage "host's" actions are encompassed
within the Minnesota Civil Damages Act, (the Act) and the Minnesota
Supreme Court interprets the Act to preclude such victim's rights to com-
pensation.
Minnesota courts have precluded social hosts from liability under the
Minnesota Civil Damages Act since 1982. In Koehnen v. Dufuor,8 the Min-
nesota Supreme Court had the opportunity to confine its interpretation of
the Act to apply only to commercial vendors. However, the court failed to
do so, basing its decision simply on precedent.9 By its holding, the court
ignored the obvious difficulties in applying the Act exclusively to commer-
cial vendors. The Koehnen case raised salient questions that the Minnesota
Supreme Court refused to address in its interpretation of the case. Thus,
other cases like Koehnen will continue to arise.
Part II of this note will begin by briefly describing how other states
approach the issue of social host liability, and whether courts have inter-
preted various civil damage statutes consistently with Minnesota courts.10
Part II will continue with a discussion of the judicial and legislative history
of Minnesota's Civil Damages Act." Part III of the note will closely exam-
ine the facts of Koehnen, and the court's opinion. Part IV will argue two13
main points. First, that the decision in Koehnen, although consistent with
state precedent, leaves many questions unanswered with respect to the
Civil Damages Act's language and true meaning. Second, that legitimate
public policy concerns justify some degree of social host liability.14
4. Appellant's Brief at 4-5, Koehnen v. Dufuor, 590 N.W.2d 107 (Minn.
1999) (No. C7-97-1820).
5. See id.
6. See MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 1 (1998).
7. See Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Minn. 1982).
8. 590 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1999). Please note that the proper spelling of
Dufuor is Dufour. SeeAppellant's Brief, Koehnen (No. C7-97-1820).
9. See Koehnen, 590 N.W.2d at 108.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part [V.A.
14. See Edmond L. Raymond, Annotation, Social Host's Liability for Injuries Oc-
curred by Third Parties as a Result of Intoxicated Guest's Negligence, 62 A.L.R.4th 16, 47-
60 (1988) (discussing the various methods of bringing a cause of action against
social hosts in this context).
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A. Social Host Liability on a National Level
Recently, numerous articles have surfaced addressing the applicabil-
ity of dram shop 15 laws to social hosts.16 While at least one commentator
suggests that the majority of states do not recognize a statutory form of so-
cial host liability, this observance is not entirely accurate.17 Indeed, the
majority of state legislatures have enacted some form of dram shop 
law.' a
19
The language of the statutes varies by state. Some of the statutes specifi-
15. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 494 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "dram shop" as
a drinking establishment where liquors are sold to be drunk on the premises; a bar
or saloon).
16. See generally RobertJ. Evola, The Legislative Preemption of Social Host Liability
in Illinois: An Analysis of Charles v. Seigfried, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 635, 635 (1997)
(stating that it is the legislature's decision to adopt social host liability as there is
no independent common law cause of action); Sabrina A. Hall, Clouded Judgment:
The Implications of Smith v. Merritt in the Realm of Social Host Liability and Underage
Drinking in Texas, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 207, 218-19 (1998) (explaining that the Texas
Dram Shop Act does not apply to social hosts, leaving the issue of social host liabil-
ity to the common law); Sean A. O'Connor, Last Call: The South Carolina Supreme
Court Turns Out the Lights on First-Party Plaintiffs' Causes of Action Against Tavern
Owners, 50 S.C. L. Rv. 1095, 1120 (1999) (asserting that criminal penalties and
the risk of third-party actions maintain incentive for responsible behavior by tav-
em owners).
17. SeeJon R. Erickson & Donna Harper Hamilton, Liability of Commercial Ven-
dors, Employers, and Social Hosts for Torts of the Intoxicated, 19 WAKE FoREST L. REV.
1013, 1015-17 (1983) (stating that dram shop acts are generally not applied to gra-
tuitous social hosts).
18. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (Michie 1998);
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-311 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 1247-801
(West Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.125 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-40 (Supp. 1999); IDAHO CODE § 23-
808 (1995); 43 ILL. COMp. STAT. 135 (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-5-10-15.5
(West Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.1 (West 1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, § 2504 (West
1988); MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. § 340A-801
(1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.053 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §
27-1-710 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507-F:1 to -8 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2A:22A-1 to -7 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 (Michie 1996); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAw § 11-101 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121 (1989); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 5-01-06.1 (1987); OHso REv. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (West Supp.
1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.950 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 3-14-1 to -14 (1998);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-10-102 (1989); TEX. ALcO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 2.02 (West
1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-14-101 (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1999);
WVO. STAT. ANN. § 12-5-502 (Michie 1999).
19. Compare ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-311 (West 1995) and COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 1247-801 (West Supp. 1998) (stating "licensee" specifically as the party to
whom the state dram shop law will apply), with MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-710
(1999) (stating that a person or entity will not be held liable pursuant to the dram
20001
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cally identify licensees as the party against whom an action can be
21
brought. In contrast, other statutes, presuming the actual drinking of
alcohol to be the problem, penalize alcohol consumption, rather than the
22sale. In any event, many states have established limited causes of action
against parties who knowingly serve alcohol to either a minor or an adult
who is obviously intoxicated. Therefore, one could argue that statutory
social host liability does exist in limited circumstances.
Generally, however, courts have not recognized a third party, statu-
24tory cause of action against social hosts for the acts of intoxicated guests.
shop act unless alcohol is served to a person under the legal drinking age, a per-
son who is obviously intoxicated, or a person who is forced or coerced to con-
sume).
20. See BLAcK'S LAw DICrIONARY 921 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "licensee" as "a
person who has a privilege to enter upon land arising from the permission or con-
sent, express or implied, of the possessor of land but who goes on the land for his
own purpose rather than for any purpose or interest of the possessor.").
21. SeeALAsKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (1998); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-311 (West
1995); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-47-801 (West Supp. 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. §
123.92 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 (Michie 1996); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 18B-121 (1989); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 12-5-502 (Michie 1999).
22. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-40 (Supp. 1999); IDAHO CODE § 23-808, subd. 1
(1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.053 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999) (specifying that con-
sumption, rather than the actual sale, is the proximate cause of any injury).
23. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.125 (1997) (stating that a person who sells alco-
holic beverages shall not be held liable unless that person willfully and unlawfully
serves to minors); IDAHO CODE § 23-808, subd. 3 (1995) (stating that no liability
will attach to any person who sold or otherwise furnished alcoholic beverages, un-
less they did so to a minor or a person who was obviously intoxicated); IND. CODE
ANN. § 7.1-5-10-15.5 (West Supp. 1999) (stating that no liability will be attached to
a "furnishor" unless that furnishor had actual knowledge of intoxication and the
intoxication was a proximate cause of damages set forth in the complaint); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-710 (1999) (stating that a person or entity is not liable unless the
person being served is a minor, obviously intoxicated, or the party forces a person
into consuming alcohol).
24. See Beeson v. Scoles Cadillac Corp., 506 So. 2d 999, 1000-01 (Ala. 1987)
(stating that social host liability directly contradicts legislative intent and judicial
precedent); Andre v. Ingram, 210 Cal. Rptr. 150, 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (hold-
ing that a social host is not legally accountable for damages resulting from the
consumption of alcohol); Johnston v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 788 P.2d 159,
163 (Haw. 1990) (stating that no statutory cause of action exists for social host li-
ability under Hawaii law); Heldt v. Brei, 455 N.E.2d 842, 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(holding an "uncompensated social host" not liable); Baxter v. Galligher, 604
N.E.2d 1245, 1246-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming summary judgment for de-
fendant in part because Indiana's Dram Shop Law shields individuals who provide
alcoholic beverages from suit, unless the person drinking is obviously intoxicated
and the intoxication is the proximate cause of the accident); D'Amico v. Christie,
71 N.Y.2d 76, 83-84 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (holding that no liability exists to third
party where there was no expectation of profit from the sale of alcohol); Smith v.
Merritt, 940 S.W.2d 602, 605-07 (Tex. 1997) (holding that to allow social host li-
ability for serving persons over age 18 would be contrary to legislative intent). See
[Vol. 26:1
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While a number of courts have recognized either a common law cause of
action or liability based on the violation of liquor control statutes, courts
have remained insistent upon applying their respective dram shop acts• 21
solely to commercial vendors.
There are a number of reasons for courts' reluctance to create social
26
host liability pursuant to a particular dram shop law. First, courts argue
that the determination of who will be held liable under a dram shop law is
27
a legislative role, not a judicial one. Second, courts have identified alco-
hol consumption and not hosts' furnishing of alcohol as the cause of inju-
ries.
28
A third reason courts avoid social host liability is the inherent differ-
ences between social hosts and licensees. One difference is the licen-
see's ability to spread the cost of liability, or alternatively, the cost of an
generally Raymond, supra note 14, at 47-60 (discussing the various methods of
bringing a cause of action against social hosts in this context).
25. See Clendening v. Shipton, 196 Cal. Rptr. 654, 657-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983);
Ashlock v. Norris, 475 N.E.2d 1167, 1169 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Kelly v. Gwinnell,
476 A.2d 1219, 1224 (N.J. 1984); Walker v. Key, 686 P.2d 973, 978 (N.M. Ct. App.
1984); see also Kenneth F. Lewis, Pennsylvania's Limitations on Social Host Liability:
Adding Insult to Injury?, 97 DICK. L. REv. 753, 759-60 (1993) (stating that most
courts believe liability should be imposed by legislative action); SpringJ. Walton et
al., The High Cost of Partying: Social Host Liability for Fraternities and Colleges, 14
WHrTIER L. REv. 659, 662-64 (1993) (stating that dram shop acts have been en-
acted to impose liability on commercial vendors). The authors acknowledge that
the possibility is remote for social hosts to be held statutorily liable to injured third
parties for furnishing adult guests alcohol. See id. However, a social host will be
far more likely to be held liable for furnishing alcohol to a minor through a liquor
control statute. See id. at 664. See generally Weiner v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha
Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18, 23 (Or. 1971) (allowing a common law cause
of action against a social host).
26. See Dowell v. Gracewood Fruit Co., 559 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. 1990);
Koehnen v. Dufuor, 590 N.W.2d 107, 111-13 (Minn. 1999); DAmico 71 N.Y.2d at
84; see also Lowe v. Rubin, 424 N.E.2d 710, 712-13 (I11. App. Ct. 1981) (citing De
Moulin & Whitcomb, Social Host's Liability in Furnishing Alcoholic Beverages, 27
FED'N. INS. COUNSEL Q. 349, 357 (1977)). DeMoulin and Whitcomb state that the
historic rationale in applying a dram shop law to taverns rather than social hosts
has been the pecuniary gain that taverns receive by providing alcohol. See id. The
authors continue by stating that while a commercial vendor may be required by
statute to have insurance for dram shop liability, the social host does not have that
requirement, and if the social host were found liable that person would have to
absorb the cost that insurance or a bond would presumably cover if insurance or a
bond were obtained by social hosts. See id.
27. See Lewis, supra note 25, at 759 (acknowledging that indeed, one of the
recurring arguments against social host liability is that it is a legislative role, and
not a judicial one, to deviate from the accepted norms of social host preclusion
from liability).
28. SeeJohnson v. Helary, Inc., 342 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Minn. 1984); Robinson
v. Lamott, 289 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Minn. 1979).
29. See Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
2000]
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insurance policy, among its customer base.30 A social host on the other
hand would be forced to bear the burden of liability alone. ' Second, a
licensee has more experience with the effects of alcohol on customers and
32
therefore is better able to deal with intoxicated persons. This argument
suggests that the bartender, who presumably deals with the alcohol-
consuming public every day, is more experienced than the social host in
determining levels and degrees of intoxication.3 A final difference fo-
cuses on the control licensees and social hosts exercise in furnishing alco-
hol.s4 In a bar or restaurant setting, a bartender or the wait-staff serve al-5
cohol to the customer. Contrarily, in a social setting, guests serve
themselves, and often, the social hosts drink with their guests. Conse-
quently, the social host may be unaware of those who are 
intoxicated.3 7
One final argument against social host liability posits that litigation
38
will increase if the cause of action is recognized. To be sure, the notion
of a potential lawsuit creates a struggle for social hosts to determine what
safeguards must be maintained to avoid liability.39 For example, citizens
may begin to search for homeowner's insurance policies that cover liabil-
ity for incidents that result from a social gathering. Additionally, social
hosts might have to refrain from drinking, or closely monitor the furnish-
ing and consumption of alcohol. These arguments present policy con-
cerns that courts must consider prior to making decisions on social host
liability pursuant to a dram shop law.
1. Utah's Social Host Liability-Stephens v. Bonneville
While the current legal attitude denying adult social host liability
seems to be clear, this sentiment has not always been reality.4° Recently,
Utah departed from the norm, recognizing adult social host liability pur-
suant to its dram shop law.4'
30. See id. at 1234.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 1233.





38. See generally Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co. 199 N.E.2d 300, 306 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1964) (articulating the floodgates of litigation argument).
39. See id. at 304.
40. SeeRoss v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 122, 200 N.W.2d 149, 153 (1972) (holding
that indeed there was statutory social host liability); see also Williams v. Klemesrud,
197 N.W.2d 614, 615-16 (Iowa 1972) (holding that statutory social host liability ex-
ists).
41. See Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520-22 (Utah 1997).
[Vol. 26:1
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In Stephens v. Bonneville,42 the Utah Supreme Court held that the state
dram shop law imposes potential liability on "any person" who provides
"liquor" to any person enumerated in the act at prescribed locations.
44
While Utah has not extended social host liability to those that serve beer
in a social setting, the court's rationale in applying the limited social host
liability to those who serve liquor is important. In rendering its decision,
the court cited the clear and unambiguous language of the statute as the
main reason for applying social host liability. In particular, the court47
identified two aspects of the statute that were dispositive. First, the court
cited the words "give" and "otherwise provide" as words that apply to so-
cial hosts and commercial establishments alike. 4s Not surprisingly, the
Utah Supreme Court develowed the same rationale as the Minnesota Su-
preme Court in Ross v. Ross. The court stated that the words "give" and
"otherwise provide" are actions that would apply to social hosts, while
words like "sell" would most likely implicate a commercial establishment. °
Second, the Utah Supreme Court recognized clearly and unambiguously
that "any person" might be liable.5 1 The language does not specifically
52limit the statute's application to commercial establishments. Therefore,
42. See id.
43. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-14-101 (1999).
44. See Stephens, 935 P.2d at 522. The Utah Supreme Court did make a dis-
tinction between "any person" that sold liquor and "any person" that sold beer. See
id. at 520-21. The court used the definitions given to the terms "liquor" and "al-
coholic beverages" by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (ABCA) when analyzing
its dram shop law. See id. The court stated that "alcoholic beverages" were statuto-
rily defined to include both "liquor" and "beer," and that the term "liquor" was
defined to exclude "beer." In Sneddon v. Graham, the court of appeals rejected the
plaintiff's claim for social host liability because the defendant had served beer
rather than alcohol, and the plain language of the statute did not permit social
host liability with respect to the service of beer. See Sneddon, 821 P.2d 1185, 1188
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
45. See Stephens, 935 P.2d at 522.
46. See id. at 521-22. This portion of the decision was articulated in response
to the defendant's claim that Utah's dram shop act was intended to apply strictly
to those in commercial establishments because the word dram shop (which means
a drinking establishment where beer is sold, i.e., bar or saloon) appears in the title
of the statute. See id. at 521. The court stated that only in the wake of ambiguous
language should it take into consideration what the title of the statute states. See
id. at 521-22. The court stated that since the language is not ambiguous and the
plain language of the statute is clear, the court found it "inappropriate" to apply
the statute to just bars and saloons. See id. at 522.
47. See id. at 522.
48. See id.
49. 294 Minn. 115, 121, 200 N.W.2d 149, 153 (1972); see also Stephens, 935
P.2d at 522.
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the court held that the statute was not restricted to commercial vendors.5"
In contrast to Utah, the current trend in other states has been, and
continues to be, social host preclusion from liability pursuant to dram
shop laws. However, courts that follow precedent, without addressing
ambiguous statutory language or policy concerns, leave third parties igno-
rant of their rights and social hosts unaware of their obligations. With its
holding in Koehnen, the Minnesota Supreme Court made this contention
reality in Minnesota.
B. Legislative History of the Minnesota Civil Damages Act
The Act currently states: "[a] spouse, child.., or other person in-
jured.., has a right of action... against a person who caused the intoxi-
cation of that person by illegally selling alcoholic beverages." 54 The legis-
lative history leading up to this language features a number of significant
developments.
Minnesota's Civil Damages Act was first enacted in 1911. 55 Origi-
nally, the statute stated that any person who 5provided liquor to another
might be liable for damages to a third party. The statute never specifi-
cally defined "any person," and gave no indication that the intent of the
statute was to apply to any particular group or entity.57
For the next sixty years, the Act remained virtually unchanged. 58By
1972 in the Ross decision, when the court faced its first real challenge to
the statute's language, the statute stated specifically that "[e]very ... per-
son who is injured.., by any intoxicated person.., has a right of ac-
ton... against any person who, by illegally selling, bartering or giving in-
toxicating liquors, caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages
53. See id. It is important to also note that the defendant asserted a public
policy argument against applying liability to social hosts. See id. The defendant
argued that the increase in litigation should be avoided unless the legislature is
unmistakably clear of its intentions to do so. See id. Conversely, the author of the
concurrence stated that it seems a more coherent social policy to apply dram shop
sanctions equally to all alcoholic beverages instead of just liquor. See id. at 523
(Zimmerman, C.J., concurring).
54. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 1 (1998).
55. See Act of Apr. 18, 1911, ch. 175, 1911 Minn. Laws 221; Ross v. Ross, 294
Minn. 115, 119, 200 N.W.2d 149, 151 (1972); Michael K. Steenson, With the Legisla-
ture's Permission and the Supreme Court's Consent, Common Law Social Host Liability Re-
turns to Minnesota, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 45, 53 n.38 (1995) (recognizing that
the Civil Damages Act gave a cause of action against persons as well as liquor busi-
nesses).
56. See Ch. 175, 1911 Minn. Laws at 221.
57. See id. After researching the circumstances surrounding the adoption of
the 1911 Civil Damages Act, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the Act
applied to "every violator whether in the liquor business or not." See Ross, 294
Minn. at 121, 200 N.W.2d at 152-53.
58. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 26:1
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In 1977, five years after the Ross decision, ° the legislature amended
61 62
the Act. The amendment removed the word "giving" from the statute.
As a result, the Act stated, "[e]very... person who is injured.., by any
intoxicated person ... has a right of action... against any person who, by
illegally selling or bartering intoxicating liquors, caused the intoxication
of such person." At lease one commentator has suggested that the re-
moval of the word "giving" released social hosts from liability pursuant to
the Act.'
In 1985, the legislature repealed and replaced the 1977 Civil Dam-. 65
ages Act with a new Act. In that same year, the legislature amended the
Act. The new Act no longer included the word "barter," and instead,
stated that only a person that "illegally sold" alcoholic beverages could be
67liable. The pertinent section of the statute then read, "[a] spouse,
child.., or other person injured.., by an intoxicated person... has a
right of action.., for all damages sustained against a person who caused
the intoxication of that person by illegally selling alcoholic beverages."
68
This change stemmed from a case involving the specific meaning of the
word "barter."69 As a result of the amendment, there was no longer a
need for the court to define "barter" in this context.
In 1990, the legislature made a last major amendment to the Act.
The legislature added subdivision six to the statute, which allows a party to
bring a common law cause of action against "any person 21 years old or
older who knowingly provides or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person
under the age of 21 years."  The 1990 amendment is an important
change to the statute. A commentator has suggested that "[s]ubdivision 6
should be interpreted to bring back social host liability, at least in the case
59. MiNN. STAT. § 340.95 (1972) (amended 1977).
60. The Ross decision interpreted the statute to say that social hosts will be
liable under the Act. SeeRoss, 294 Minn. at 117, 200 N.W.2d at 150.
61. See MiNN. STAT. § 340.95 (Supp. 1977) (repealed 1985).
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See Kathy T. Graham, Liability of the Social Host for Injuries Caused by the Neg-
ligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 16 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 561, 568 (1980) (suggesting
that the removal of the word "giving" from Minnesota's dram shop act makes it
clear that the Act only applies to the seller of alcoholic beverages and not to a so-
cial host).




69. See Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593, 596 (Minn. 1982) (holding that the
Act applied only to those in the business of providing liquor, and not those social
hosts who happened to receive consideration for providing alcohol to guests).
70. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 6 (1990) (emphasis added).
2000]
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of minors .... Similarly, another commentator has stated that the leg-
islature's amendment is abruptly different from its previous actions re-
garding civil liability for injuries arising from the sale of alcohol.72 Irre-
spective of theories regarding the 1990 amendment's purpose, it has
provided a tool for innocent third parties to recover from the party that
provided the alcohol whether or not that party had a license to sell alco-
hol.
C. Judicial History of the Minnesota Civil Damages Act
The statutory amendments, and their subsequent judicial interpreta-
tions, were important aspects of the Koehnen court's decision. Of par-
ticular significance was the court's interpretation regarding social hosts,
minors, and the words and phrases "giving," "barter," "illegal sale" and
"other persons." Previously, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Ross v.
Ross74 had held that "any person" who illegally gave or sold liquor to another per-
son could be liable under the Minnesota Civil Damages Act for damages
resulting from the transaction.7 5 The court noted that the Act applied
only to illegal transactions, therefore it was not unreasonable to assume
the legislature's intentions were to include persons other than commer-76
cial vendors. The Ross decision marked the first time the court held a
"social host" liable for damages to another person pursuant to the Act.77
Since then, the court has been reluctant to apply the Act to "any per-
son" other than a commercial vendor. In Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park,
79
the court held that the 1977 amendment removing the word "giving" was
legislative activity indicating that social hosts were immune from liability
80under the Act. In rendering its decision, the Cole court considered the
71. Logan N. Foreman III & Joel E. Smith, Social Host Liability, MINN. TRIAL
LAw., Winter 1993, at 15.
72. See Steenson, supra note 55, at 46 (commenting that subdivision six is yet
another attack on the narrow scope of the Act).
73. See Koehnen v. Dufuor, 590 N.W.2d 107, 109-13 (Minn. 1999) (citing ju-
dicial history as precedent for its decision).
74. 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972).
75. See id. at 119, 200 N.W.2d at 151 (emphasis added).
76. See id. at 121, 200 N.W.2d at 153 (emphasis added).
77. See id. The Ross opinion stated that the only Minnesota case which had
dealt with an action against a defendant that was not in the liquor business was
Dahlin v. Kron, 232 Minn. 312, 45 N.W.2d 833 (Minn. 1950). See Ross, 294 Minn.
at 119, 200 N.W.2d at 152. The Ross opinion also discussed the fact that the lan-
guage of the Act, which included "any person," meant that the legislature in-
tended to include other persons outside of the liquor business. See id. at 121, 200
N.W.2d at 153.
78. See Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593, 596 (Minn. 1982); Cole v. City of
Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836, 840 (Minn. 1982).
79. 314 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1982).
80. See id. at 840.
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transcript of the floor debate in the State Senate on the proposed
amendment to delete the word "giving" from the Civil Damages Act.8 '
The court concluded that the Senate language indicated that the legisla-
ture was cognizant of the Ross decision, and purposefully proposed the
amendment, abrogating the court's interpretation in Ross. Three weeks
after the Cole decision, in Cady v. Coleman, the court stated that the legis-
lative intent to restrict liability only to commercial vendors was clear based
on the deletion of the word "giving."84 This holding furthered the Cole
court's interpretation of the Act.
Further, in Holmquist v. Miller,85 while addressing the issue of provid-
ing minors with alcohol, the court held that a social host was not liable in
a common law action for negligently serving alcohol to a minor . 6 The
court stated that the Act preempted the field of social host liability. s
In 1989, the court, in response to the 1985 amendment that removed
the word "barter" from the statute, articulated a test for determining what
constitutes an illegal sale.8 However, the court never defined the word
"illegal."89 This is an important distinction since the illegal sale test ap-
plies generally to Chapter 340 of the Minnesota statutes, and not specifi-
cally to the Civil Damages Act.90
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court again revisited the Civil
Damages Act.9' Unlike the previously discussed judicial interpretations,
81. See id. at 839.
82. See id.
83. 315 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. 1982).
84. See id. at 596.
85. 367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985).
86. See id. at 472. Holmquist predates the addition of subdivision six to Minne-
sota Statute section 340A.801 which one commentator suggests brings back social
host liability in the case of minors. See Foreman & Smith, supra note 71 and ac-
companying text.
87. See Holmquist, 367 N.W.2d at 472.
88. See Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn. 1989) (stating that the
court would use a four-prong test in determining what constituted an illegal sale).
The Rambaum court's four-prong test consisted of the following: first, did the sale
violate Minnesota Statute section 340A; second, if so, was the "violation substan-
tially related to the mischief sought to be suppressed and the remedy sought to be
advanced by the Act;" third, was the illegal sale the cause of intoxication; and
fourth, was the intoxication a cause of the injuries. See id.
89. See id; cf BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 747 (6th ed. 1990) (defining illegal as
"[a]gainst or not authorized by law"). As mentioned earlier, one year later, the
Act was amended again. See MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 6 (1990). The 1990
amendment contradicts the judicial interpretation of actions regarding civil liabil-
ity in that it allows certain common law actions against specific social hosts. See
Steenson, supra note 55, at 46. The Act now permits the imposition of liability on
persons over 21 who knowingly furnish alcohol to minors in common law claims
independent of the Act. See MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 6 (1998).
90. See Rambaum, 435 N.W.2d at 19.
91. See Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enter. Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 856 (Minn. 1998).
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this time the court was asked to interpret the initial clause of the Act, spe-
cifically, "what persons" can bring a third-party claim pursuant to the
92 c u tAct. In Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enterprises, Inc., the court held that a fiancde
fell into the category of "other person," and therefore was entitled to
bring a cause of action for damages. 94 The court used two arguments to
reach its decision. 95
First, the court defined the meaning of the words "other person" in
the Act.9 6 In this particular section of the Act, "other person" is defined as
any other person injured by the intoxication of another and who played
no role in causing the intoxication. 7 The court then concluded that since
the fiancee and her daughter were clearly innocent third parties that
played no role in causing the accident, they fit into the category of "other
person," and therefore, could bring a cause of action.98
More important, however, was the court's discussion regarding the
Act's overall purpose and meaning. 99 The court stated, "the intent and
purpose [of the Act] are clear. The mischief to be suppressed is the ille-
gal furnishing of liquor causing a person's intoxication and the remedy to
be advanced is the protection of innocent third persons injured as a result
by providing those persons a claim of civil damage." 1°°
The Lefto and Ross decisions are consistent with the true meaning of10110




However, with the exception of Leflo, the cases interpreting the Act after• . 103
the Ross decision seem to do so conservatively. As a result, social hosts
92. See id.
93. 581 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 1998).
94. See id. at 857-58.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 857. The court refused to embrace the Appellant's argument
that suggested the court utilize the concept of ejusdem generis from the canons of
construction to define "other person." See id. at 856-57 (quoting MINN. STAT. §
645.08, subd. 3 (1996) (stating that general words are construed to be restricted in
their meaning by preceding particular words)). Since the court found that the






101. See id; Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 120, 200 N.W.2d 149, 152 (1972) (rec-
oguizing that the construction of the Act should be liberal, to suppress the mis-
chief and advance the remedy); see also Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428,
436, 57 N.W.2d 254, 261 (1953) (stating that "person" applied to municipalities
under the Act).
102. See Lefto, 581 N.W.2d at 857; Ross, 294 Minn. at 120, 200 N.W.2d at 152.
103. See Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593, 596 (Minn. 1982) (stating that the
legislature's intent to restrict liability under the Act to commercial vendors was
sufficiently clear with their removal of the word "giving"); Cole v. City of Spring
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remain immune from statutory liability under the Minnesota Civil Dam-
ages Act.104 Koehnen v. Dufuor, another example of conservative interpreta-
tion of the Act, is the most recent case to preclude social host liability pur-
suant to the Act.
1 0 5
III. THE KOEHNEN CASE
A. The Facts
Rachel Paul, at the age of seventeen, hosted a party at her father's
house on September 20, 1991.106 An adult bought a keg of beer for Paul's107
party. Paul charged each person that came to her party between $2 and
$4 for a glass. 108 The guests were then allowed unlimited refills of beer us-109
ing their glasses. Although Paul invited some of her friends, there were
many uninvited guests in attendance. 110
On the same evening, Joseph Koehnen was visiting his sister at her
house, which was near Rachel Paul's home. 1 1 During the evening,
Koehnen went outside to check on his truck parked in his sister's drive-112
way. Three of Paul's uninvited guests were leaving the party and con-
fronted Koehnen." 3 One of the guests punched Koehnen in the face,114
causing him to hit his head on the pavement. As a result, Koehnen sus-
tained severe injuries.15
Joseph Koehnen sued Rachel Paul alleging a violation of the Minne-
sota Civil Damages Act. 16 The district court granted Paul's motion for
Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836, 840 (Minn. 1982) (stating that the removal of the
word "giving" is legislative activity that mandates an interpretation precluding so-
cial hosts from liability under the Act and refusing to address the underlying pur-
pose of the statute articulated in Ross and Hahn); see also Koehnen v. Dufuor, 590
N.W.2d 107, 112-13 (Minn. 1999) (holding generally that the court must follow
precedent based on the Cole and Cady decisions and the court's interpretation of
the legislative intent surrounding the Act).
104. See Koehnen, 590 N.W.2d at 113.
105. See id.







113. See id. The names of the three uninvited guests were David Ray Anderson,
Gil Bukrinsky and Daniel R. Dufour. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id. Joseph Koehnen also sued Rachel Paul's parents, Daniel Dufour
and his parents, Gil Bukrinsky and his father, and David Ray Anderson on various
theories of negligence. See id. All of these suits were settled except the claims
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summary judgment holding that the statute only applied to "commercial
vendors," and that since Paul was a social host, she was immune from li-/.. 11718
ability. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. "8
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court's Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of119
appeals. The court stated that precedent and the principle of the sepa-
ration of powers dictated the result.12 The court declined to further in-
terpret the Act, stating that the legislature, not the court, should decide.... 121
whether to revisit the Act. To a certain extent, the court also discussed
the historical interpretation of the Act. 2 2 While the court recognized
subdivision six, the court stated that the subdivision was a creature of the
legislature, and reemphasized its reliance on the Cady decision. 12' The
court stated that Cady "unequivocally" limited the Act's application to
commercial vendors.'2 4 It continued by stating that since there has been
no legislative response to the Cady decision, there is no doubt that the
Civil Damages Act is limited to commercial vendors. 125 Additionally, the
court confirmed the district court's position that since Paul was a social
host, she was immune from liability under the Act.121
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The True Spirit of the Act
127
While Koehnen arguably follows precedent, the reach of the court's
against Anderson and Rachel Paul. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 113 (referring to Ross as the basis for stating that it is the legisla-
ture's job to determine the reach of the Act); see also Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d
593, 596 (Minn. 1982) (explaining that the Act applies to any "person in the busi-
ness of providing liquor, and not a social host who happens to receive some con-
sideration from his guests in return for drinks he provides"); Cole v. City of Spring
Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Minn. 1982) (holding that the Act "preempted
any action against social hosts who give liquor to guests").
120. See Koehnen, 590 N.W.2d at 113.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 109-12.
123. See id. at 111-12.
124. See id. at 112.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 113.
127. See id. at 112 (stating that when a court of last resort has construed the
language of a law the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter
intends the same construction to be placed upon such language). The legislature
thus presumptively adopted the Cole and Cady rulings since there has been no
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analysis is insufficient; it ignores the true spirit of the Act, namely, protect-
ing innocent third parties from injury.128
The court's reliance on the Cole and Cady decisions triggered the
Koehnen result.'2 The Cole court held that the Act preempted any action
against social hosts. i0 However, the Cole court refused to embark on the
subject of whether a social host who sold alcohol could be held liable.'
This subject is an important concept since Rachel Paul did sell alcohol,
and did not merely give it away. The Cady holding stated that liability ap-
plied to any person in the business of providing liquor, not a social host
who happens to receive consideration.3 2 Unlike Koehnen however, the
Cady holding is mired in the facts of a barter between an attorney and his
client. 1 Furthermore, the holding in Cady addresses the issue of consid-
eration, not social host liability. 134
In addition to relying on Cole and Cady, the Koehnen court relied
heavily on the legislative history of the Act. 13 However, the court's reti-
cence regarding subdivision six and the fact that adult "social hosts" now
can be liable under a theory of common law negligence, s6 is disconcert-
ing at best.
The principle of "separation of powers" dictates that the role of the
amendment to the contrary. See id.
128. See e.g., Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enters., Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Minn.
1998) (stating that the intent and purpose of the Act is the protection of innocent
third persons).
129. SeeKoehnen, 590 N.W.2d at 110,113.
130. See Cole v. City of Spring of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836, 837
(Minn. 1982) (relying on the analysis of the history of the Act, including the 1977
amendment); see also Graham, supra note 64, at 568 (suggesting that the legislature
did not intend social host liability).
131. See generally Cole, 314 N.W.2d at 839 (stating that the majority of cases in-
volve the sale of alcohol). But see Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 220, 200 N.W.2d
149, 152 (1972) (explaining that it was not the court's prerogative to amend the
Act to include those not in the liquor business in their pre-1977 amendment rul-
ing).
132. See Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593, 596 (Minn. 1982) (stating that the
legislative intent clearly restricts the Act to apply only to commercial vendors).
133. See id. at 594-96. The facts of the case involve an attorney who began buy-
ing drinks for his client after a round of golf. See id. at 594. The attorney claimed
to have purchased the drinks in exchange for continued client referrals. See id. at
595. The court stated in dicta that it would be illogical to impose liability under
the Act because it would be difficult in a social setting to determine whether a sale
or barter was consummated. See id.
134. See id. at 596.
135. See Koehnen, 590 N.W.2d at 112 (stating that where the legislature has per-
ceived the court's holding to stray from the actual intent of the statute, the legisla-
ture has reacted in the past by amending the Act).
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legislative body is to create and adopt laws; i1 7 the judicial branch's role isS 138
to interpret laws based on legislative intent and legal precedent. Follow-
ing this principle, based on the plain language of the statute as well as the• 139
true intent of the Act, Rachel Paul should have been held liable for her
actions. 40 Case law is clear in professing that if the statute is ambiguous; it
is the court's job to utilize legslative intent to determine the meaning of
the provision of the statute. However, the case law also holds that if the
statute is unambig uous, it is not the court's role to challenge the wisdom
of the legislature. In this case "illegal sale" is unambiguous, and the
meaning does not apply to merely commercial vendors. It is illogical,
based on the clear, unambiguous language of the statute, to conclude that
the removing the word "giving" precludes unlicensed individuals who ille-
gally sell alcohol from liability under the statute. If the legislature wants
to make the statute applicable to only commercial vendors, that intent
should be expressly stated, and the courts should interpret accordingly.
While the Koehnen court relied heavily on the Cole and Cady decisions
in rendering judgment, it completely ignored Rambaum v. Swisher, and its
"illegal sale" test. The Rambaum court developed a four-prong test to
determine whether a liquor sale is illegal. 44 The first prong asks whether
the liquor sale was a violation of Minnesota Statute section 340A.14 5 If so,
the court then asks whether the violation was substantially related to the
mischief sought to be suppressed, and the remedy sought to be advanced,
by the Act. The final two prongs involve causation questions not rele-
vant to this analysis. 14 7 The Rambaum court applied the test to a fraternal
club's liquor sale to a non-member or non-guest, who subsequently in-
137. See MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1.
138. See In re Fairview-Univ. Med. Ctr., 590 N.W.2d 150, 153 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999) (stating that the court's role is to discover and effectuate the legislature's
intent); see also State v. R.S.J., Inc., 552 N.W.2d 695, 701 (Minn. 1996) ("[if the
legislature's intent is clearly manifested by [the] plain and unambiguous language
of the statute, statutory construction is neither necessary nor permitted.").
139. SeeMIIN. STAT. § 430A.801, subd. 1 (1998).
140. See Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 558 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Minn. 1997) (stating
that the court's role is not to challenge the wisdom of the legislature, but "to give
effect to its will as expressed in the unambiguous language of the statute"). But see
Stawikowski v. Collins Elec. Constr. Co., 289 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Minn. 1979) (stat-
ing that when the language of the statute is ambiguous, the court's role is to "as-
certain and effectuate the intention of the legislature").
141. See Stawikowski, 289 N.W.2d at 395.
142. See Olson, 558 N.W.2d at 496.
143. See Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn. 1989); see also supra
text accompanying notes 88-90.
144. See Rambaum, 435 N.W.2d at 21 (holding that a club sale to a non-member
or non-guest was an illegal sale for dram shop purposes).
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id; see also supra note 88.
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jured a third person. However, in articulating this standard, the court
did not specifically limit the test's application solely to commercial ven-14910
dors, despite the Koehnen court's contention in this regard. 15 The test's
first prong is evidence that the "illegal sale" test may be applied to persons
other than commercial vendors. It asks whether the sale violates Minne-
sota Statute chapter 340A generally, and is not specific to a particular sec-151
tion of the chapter. Despite this precedent, the Koehnen court refrained
from applying that case's facts to the Rambaum test. Furthermore, the
court chose not to define "illegal" or "illegal sale" in this context (assum-
ing the court believed that the Rambaum test applied only to commercial
vendors), despite the fact that those definitions are at the crux of the de-
bate.'52
Rachel Paul committed an illegal act. She was a minor.5 3 She sold
alcohol without a license.1M  She sold alcohol to other minors. 15 Such
behavior is, by definition, illegal.
15 6
148. See Rambaum, 435 N.W.2d at 20.
149. See id. at 22.
150. SeeKoehnen v. Dufuor, 590 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1999).
151. See Rambaum, 435 N.W.2d at 21. The court held that its application of the
test is limited to club licenses under Minnesota Statute section 340A.404, subdivi-
sion one, clause three. See id. at 22.
152. See Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468, 471-72 (Minn. 1985); see also
BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 747 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "illegal" as "[a] gainst or not
authorized by law").
153. See Koehnen, 590 N.W.2d at 108.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See MINN. STAT. § 340A.503, subd. 2(1) (1998) (stating that it is unlawful
for any person to sell, barter or furnish alcoholic beverages to a person under the
age of 21); see also MrNN. STAT. § 340A.701 (1998) (amended 1999) (making it a
felony to sell alcoholic beverages to an underage purchaser who becomes intoxi-
cated and causes or suffers death or harm). Subdivision one, clause four now
states that it is a felony, "for a person other than a licensed retailer.., to violate
the provisions of 340A.503, subdivision two, clause one, if the underage person to
whom the alcoholic beverage was sold, bartered, given, or furnished becomes intoxicated
and causes or suffers death or great bodily harm as a result of the intoxication."
MINN. STAT. § 340A.701 (effective Aug. 1, 1999) (emphasis added). The proposed
bill, which eventually became law, was a response to a 1997 New Year's Eve inci-
dent. See Furnishing Alcohol to a Minor: Hearing on H.F. 261 Before the Crime Preven-
tion Committee, 81st Sess., 21st Meeting (Minn. 1999). That incident involved an
adult who provided alcohol to minors, one of who left the party and died in an
automobile crash. See id. The Ramsey County Attorney's Office was frustrated by
the fact that under current law it could only prosecute the adult for a gross mis-
demeanor since he did not charge the minor for the alcohol. See id. Persons testi-
fying in support of the bill [House File 261], included a father whose daughter
died of alcohol poisoning and the father of the minor who died in the 1997 New
Year's Eve automobile accident. See id. The fathers' testimony centered on the
tragedy of losing a child and the emotional immaturity of teenagers. See id. Al-
though the bill was not a M.A.D.D. initiative, it was supported by the organization.
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Recently, the Minnesota Legislature amended Minnesota Statute sec-
tion 340A.701 making it a felony to sell alcoholic beverages to an under-
age purchaser who becomes intoxicated and causes or suffers death or157
harm. 7The legislature broadened the language of subdivision one,
clause four to include the words "barter," "give" and "furnish."1 58 Given
current Minnesota precedent with regard to the word "give," its inclusion
means a social host can now be charged with a felony rather than a gross
misdemeanor for providing alcohol. With this new amendment as well as
the 1990 subdivision six amendment of the Act, the legislative branch of
government is becoming more aware of social host responsibility with re-
spect to furnishing alcohol. The Minnesota Legislature is slowly ap-
proaching the day when it must embark upon a meaningful discussion of
another extension of social host liability pursuant to Minnesota Statute
section 340A.801, subdivision six.
As already mentioned, the court recently interpreted the meaning of
the phrase "other person," referencing who can bring a cause of action
pursuant to the Act.'5 9 The court stated that the repeated view regarding
the interpretation of the Act is one of liberal construction to suppress
mischief and advance the remedy. 6 Despite the cases that identify with
the Leflo opinion, the Koehnen court chose a different, much more conser-
vative approach. The court's conscious choice of narrowly construing the
Act so as to impliedly define "illegal sale" as one that applies only to com-
mercial vendors contradicts the Act's purpose as well as the canons of
construction.1 6 ' Further, the court's holding does not comport with its re-
cent interpretation of the Act in Lefto, which was rendered merely one
year prior to Koehnen.
An additional problem with the court's analysis is the suppositionS 162
that Rachel Paul was in fact a social host. Without defining the term,
the court presumably concluded that since Paul was seventeen at the time
of the party, and that some of the guests were her friends, she automati-
See id. At the Committee hearings, there was some debate as to the meaning of the
word "furnish" in the statute's context. See id. It is also interesting to note that on
the same day House File 261 (the bill that ultimately became law) was being heard,
House File 1004, a bill proposing lowering the per se level for alcohol impairment
from .10 to .08 was heard. See id.
157. See MINN. STAT. § 340A.701 (effective Aug. 1, 1999).
158. See id.
159. See Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enters. Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Minn. 1998).
160. See id. (stating that the Act was intended solely to protect innocent third
parties); see also Herrly v. Muzlik, 374 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Minn. 1985) (espousing
the same sentiment as the Lefto court in that the interpretation of the Act should
be constructed liberally).
161. See Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 120, 200 N.W.2d 149, 152 (1972); MINN.
STAT. § 645.16 (1998) ("[T]he letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the
pretext of pursuing the spirit.").
162. See Koehnen v. Dufuor, 590 N.W.2d 107, 114 (Minn. 1999).
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cally fell into this category. The court justified its position on this issue
by specifying that Paul made only $70. However, the fact that Paul prof-
ited (even if only by 170) from the event should not have been a factor in
the court's decision. The plain text of the statute states, "illegally selling. .166
alcoholic beverages. Paul illegally sold alcoholic beverages. Thus, the
Act applies to her conduct.
The legislature's amendment after the Ross decision removed only
the word "giving."'67 The court's subsequent decisions have reflected the
intent of the legislature by denying recovery in instances where alcohol is
simplygiven away. But in this case, the occurrence of a sale is indisput-
able. Rachel Paul did not simply give away the beer, and, as a result, she
could not have been considered a social host.
Finally, the court placed an enormous amount of weight on the fact
that the legislature has not reacted to its interpretation of the statute for169
seventeen years. However, the legislature's inaction, even though the
Cady and Cole decisions remain law, may be evidence that the term "per-
son" cannot mean or refer only to commercial vendors.
The court's inaction is indicative of two possible realities. The first is
that the legislature is content with the way in which the court has inter-
preted this portion of the Act. As a result, the Minnesota Supreme Court
likely is comfortable relying on lower courts to recognize legal precedent
for a consistent interpretation of the Act in the future. Contrarily, the leg-
islature's inaction could mean that to this point in the statute's history,
neither the court nor the legislature has been confronted with a factual
situation where a person other than a commercial vendor could be held
liable.
163. See id. See generally Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836, 837
(Minn. 1982) (applying the term "social host" to a sister who gave her brother
beer, to an individual who gave guests free beer, to a guest at a party where a few
people contributed to the cost of the beer, and to an individual who served alco-
hol at a wedding reception). The Cole case is distinguishable from Koehnen in that
Paul sold the cups of beer to every person that came to the party. See Koehnen, 590
N.W.2d at 108. In fact, she designated another person to handle the cups and sell
them at either $2 or $4. See id. The facts in Cole and Cady demonstrate the diffi-
culty in determining whether an illegal sale has occurred in a social setting. How-
ever, in this case it is uncontroverted that Paul sold cups to every person at the
party, thus making it quite easy for the court to determine whether a sale actually
occurred. See id.
164. SeeKoehnen, 590 N.W.2d at 112 n.38.
165. See id. at 113 (Page,J, dissenting) ("[A]n illegal sale is an illegal sale is an
illegal sale . . ").
166. See MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 1 (1990).
167. See MINN. STAT. § 340.95, subd. 1 (1978).
168. See Koehnen, 590 N.W.2d at 108.
169. See id. at 112 (citing to the legislature's response after the Ross decision,
and distinguishing that decision with the realization that the legislature has yet to
react to the court's holding in Cady, which was decided 17 years before).
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If the prior is the case, the legislature could put an end to future un-
certainty and litigation by merely changing the wording of the Act to ap-
ply specifically to "any commercial vendor." If the latter is the case, the
legislature's silence on this point may be that "a person" does not neces-
sarily mean "a commercial vendor." We know from the Lefto decision that
the term "person," in clause one was given a liberal interpretation to mean
any other person injured by intoxication. 7 0 Logically, a word cannot have
two different meanings in the same document. However, according to the
Lefto and Koehnen interpretations of the Act, the court gives dual meaning
to the same term within the statute.
In short, there are a number of steps that both the Minnesota Legis-
lature and Minnesota Supreme Court could take to ensure predictability
with respect to the Act's interpretation. That is, the legislature could de-
fine the term social host specifically for purposes of the Act's interpreta-
tion and/or amend the Act to apply solely to "commercial vendors."
Likewise, the supreme court could limit the Rambaum court's definition of
"illegal sale" to the Act specifically. Until the legislature or court takes the
suggested action cases similar to Koehnen will continue to emerge.
B. Public Policy Rationale for an Expansion of Social Host Liability
There are legitimate public policy concerns that support an expan-
sion of social host liability. The first portion of this section will discuss
some of the important concerns that must be weighed when considering
expansion. The second section addresses the "floodgates of litigation" ar-
gument that critics continuously assert when an expansion of social host
liability is considered.171 The final portion of this section proposes an
amendment to Minnesota's Civil Damages Act that would expand social
host liability. The discussion will articulate why an adoption of this pro-
posal, or one similar to it, would be effective.
1. The Statistics
Traffic accidents involving alcohol are highly publicized and most of-
ten linked to discussions of toughening alcohol-related laws. Traffic acci-
dents are the single greatest cause of death for persons between the ages
of five and twenty-seven. Of those crashes, nearly half are alcohol-
related.17 3 It is estimated that 2.6 million drunken driving-related offenses
170. See Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enters. Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Minn. 1998).
171. See Charles v. Seigfried, 651 N.E.2d 154, 160-61 (Il1. 1995) (recognizing
that if social host liability were to exist, the court would be asked to answer far too
many questions with respect to the Illinois dram shop law's scope).
172. See Mothers Against Drunk Driving (M.A.D.D.), Public Policy General Statis-
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victimize 4 million people either by personal injury or property damage
yearly.' 74 Proportionately, drivers aged twenty-one through twenty-nine
drive the greatest number of their miles while drunk.'7 5 These statistics
are unfortunate realities concerning drinking and driving. Despite the
grave situation these statistics suggest, state legislatures seem content with
current solutions.
The enactment and enforcement of various dram shop laws 76 indi-
cates a legislative judgment that alcohol vendors should bare a portion of
the responsibility for providing safety from alcohol-related incidents. In
addition, more than 2300 anti-drunk driving laws have been passed in the
nation since 1980.177 Despite these perceived panaceas, alcohol-related
fatalities and injuries continue to occur. The recent decline of alcohol-
related deaths is laudable.' 78 Nonetheless, improvement in gruesome sta-
tistics should not suggest that the fight to save more lives should end. On
the contrary, any decrease in lives lost should serve as a catalyst for state
legislatures to take an even more proactive role in reducing fatalities and
protecting injured third parties.
Minnesota is one of the leading states in terms of the lowest percent-
age of alcohol-related fatalities on the highways. Of the 600 traffic fa-
talities in Minnesota in 1997, 193, or 32.2% of those were alcohol-
related.18 0 That number is down from the 1996 total, when 218 alcohol-
related fatalities were reported on Minnesota highways. Again, the de-
crease in the numbers of alcohol-related fatalities is commendable. How-
ever, the improved numbers are of little comfort to families that have suf-
fered losses.
One intention behind an expansion of social host liability is deter-
rence. If stringent penalties are enforced regarding social host liability,
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See supra note 18.
177. See M.A.D.D., Public Policy General Statistics (visited Sept. 1, 1999)
<http://www.madd.org/stats/stat-gen.shtml>; see also 23 U.S.C. § 410 (1994) (giv-
ing states monetary incentives to implement programs designed to eliminate
drinking and driving).
178. See M.A.D.D., Public Policy Statistics-The Impaired Driving Problem (visited
Sept. 1, 1999) <http://www.madd.org/stats> (stating that in 1997, 16,189 people
died in alcohol-related car crashes, whereas in 1998, 15,935 people died in alco-
hol-related car crashes).
179. See M.A.D.D., Public Policy Statistics-1997 State-By-State Traffic Fatalities (vis-
ited Sept. 1, 1999) <http://www.madd.org/stats/97_fatalitiesbystate.shtml>.
180. See id.
181. See M.A.D.D., Public Policy Statistics-1996 State-By-State Traffic Fatalities (vis-
ited Sept.1, 1999) <http://www.madd.org/stats/96_fatalitiesby-state.shtnl>.
182. This author is not suggesting that the institution of social host liability to
those that serve alcohol to adults will solve all alcohol-related problems. Merely,
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more people may act responsibly because of the threat of liability. How-
ever, the social policy concerns involved run much deeper. Indeed, many
believe that the law must address the innocent victims' need to be ade-
quately compensated for losses resulting from alcohol-related ijunres.183. ... 184
As ChiefJustice Wilentz appropriately stated in Kelly v. Gwinnel:
[W]hile we recognize the concern that our ruling will interfere
with accepted standards of social behavior; will intrude on and
somewhat diminish the enjoyment, relaxation, and camaraderie
that accompany social gatherings at which alcohol is served...
we believe that the added assurance ofjust compensation to the
victims of drunken driving as well as the added deterrent effect
of the rule on such driving outweigh the importance of those
other values185
Deterrence and compensation for loss are at the heart of the consid-
ered expansion of social host liability. The Minnesota legislature must
have concluded that these public policy concerns were truly significant or
presumably, subdivision six would not exist. The social policies that mo-
tivated the legislature in creating subdivision six are no less important
when applied to an adult. Therefore, since the legislature has expressed
its concern over these social policy factors, it should act once again, and
expand social host liability to ensure that all injured parties are fully com-
pensated.
2. Refuting the Floodgates of Litigation Argument
One of the main challenges to social host liability pursuant to dram
shop laws has been the "floodgates of litigation" argument. Critics sug-
gest that implementing civil liability pursuant to a dram shop law will
open a "Pandora's Box" to a wide range of defendants. l s This argument
provokes concern for state legislatures that wish to implement social host
liability. However, the same argument has been made against other
causes of action even though these causes of action remain viable reme-
183. See Lewis, supra note 25, at 760.
184. 476 A.2d 1219 (NJ. 1984) (holding that statutory social host liability exists
in NewJersey).
185. Id. at 1224.
186. See MINN. STAT. § 340.801A, subd. 6 (1998).
187. See Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 199 N.E.2d 300, 306 (Ill. App. Ct.
1964) (stating that if social host liability were recognized under Illinois' dram shop
law, having a drink with a neighbor could presumably become a hazardous act,
thus potentially triggering litigation); Lewis, supra note 25, at 759-60.
188. See Miller, 199 N.E.2d at 306.
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dial sources for injured plaintiffs.' 89 Additionally, courts are conscious of
the abuse in litigation with respect to these particular causes of action,
and have structured parameters for attorneys to follow when litigating a
case such as Koehnen. For example, not until recent decades has ne1i-
gent infliction of mental distress been recognized as a cause of action.
The strongest reason against the recognition of negligent infliction of
mental distress being recognized as a cause of action has been the "flood-192
gates of litigation" argument. However, "[i]t is the business of the law
to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a 'flood of litiga-
tion,' and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any
court of justice to deny relief on such grounds." 19 Minnesota courts have
developed stringent requirements to recover on claims of negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress. These stringent requirements have silenced
189. SeeW. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw oF TORTS § 12, at 55
(5th ed. 1984) (stating that the cause of action for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress has faced the "floodgates of litigation" argument).
190. See id. § 12, at 56 (stating that courts should require careful scrutiny of the
evidence supporting the claim).
191. See id. § 12, at 55.
192. See id. § 12, at 56. The author of the treatise cites to many cases that have
supported the "floodgates of litigation" argument. See id. Supporters of the
"floodgates of litigation" position argue that not only would fictitious claims in-
crease, but also that the law should not seek to secure the universal peace of mind.
See id.
193. Id.
194. See generally Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of Emotional Distress Claims in
Minnesota, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1, 1-32 (1993) (describing the historical de-
velopment of the factors that Minnesota courts have implemented to narrow the
remedial scope of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims). Today, a
plaintiff must show that he/she: (1) was in the zone of danger of physical impact;
(2) reasonably feared for his/her own safety; and (3) suffered severe emotional
distress with attendant physical manifestations. See K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d
553, 557 (Minn. 1995). However, there is an exception to the "zone of danger"
requirement: where a person has suffered mental anguish from a direct invasion
of his/her rights. See Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn. 1980). The
"zone of danger" requires objective inquiry. See K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 558. In
cases that have allowed recovery for this tort, the plaintiff provided enough objec-
tive evidence to clearly show that she was in personal peril for a period of time. See
id. The objective component of the "zone of danger" test has been a necessary
tool for Minnesota courts to ensure stability and predictability in these types of
claims. See id. In KA.C., the Minnesota Supreme Court discussed the "zone of
danger" requirement. See id. There, the court held that a plaintiff must allege ac-
tual exposure to the H.I.V. virus to prove she was in the zone of danger for assert-
ing a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See id. at 559. The court
stated that the actual exposure standard is consistent with historical concerns re-
garding a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See id. It
continued by stating that the "zone of danger rule," which leads to reasonable and
consistent results, would quiet the critics that had concern about the impact on
unintended and unreasonable results for claims of negligent infliction of emo-
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195
the arguments that the tort will open the floodgates of litigation. Min-
nesota courts require plaintiffs to meet an objective standard, ensuring
predictability and stability in an area of the law that has a potential for
abuse. 96 Likewise, the "floodgates of litigation" argument against social
host liability will cease by virtue of court-imposed guidelines similar to
those present in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases.
3. A Proposed Cause of Action
As previously discussed, subdivision six is a recent addition to the
Civil Damages Act and is an expression of the legislature's concerns re-
garding innocent victims of alcohol related torts. 9 Subdivision six allows
injured parties to bring a common law cause of action against persons
who furnish or provide alcohol to minors.'9 Arguably, the amendment
was the legislature's response to the Minnesota Supreme Court's dicta in
Holmquist v. Miller' 99 In Holmquist, the court stressed the importance of
addressing the problem of providing alcohol to minors, but ultimately
concluded that only the legislature could expand social host liability."'
Nonetheless, after subdivision six's creation, legitimate questions surfaced
201 202
regarding who would be entitled to recover, who would be liable, and
what defenses would be available.2 0 3 Since 1990, Minnesota courts have
begun to answer some of the questions with respect to its scope.
In VanWagner v. Mattison, the court of appeals gave Minnesota citi-
zens a sense of the subdivision's breadth. The court of appeals in Van-
tional distress. See id. This statement suggests that the court is aware of the flood-
gates of litigation argument regarding claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.
195. See Anita Bernstein, The Representational Dialectic (With Illustrations from Ob-
scenity, Forfeiture, and Accident Law), 87 Cal. L. Rev. 305, 342-43 (1999) (stating that
the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress once raised courts and com-
mentators to false alarm about floodgates); Leslie Benton Sandor & Carol Berry,
Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Attendant to Economic Loss: A Reas-
sessment, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 1247, 1253-59 (1995).
196. See KA.C•, 527 N.W.2d at 559.
197. See MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 6 (1990); see also supra notes 70-72 and
accompanying text.
198. See MiNN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 6 (1990).
199. 367 N.W.2d 468, 471-72 (Minn. 1985) (noting the strong public policy of
discouraging the illegal furnishing of alcohol to minors).
200. See id. at 472.
201. See Steenson, supra note 55, at 65 (questioning whether the subdivision
will apply only to injured third parties or the voluntary underage intoxicated per-
son).
202. See id. at 74 (positing whether underage persons who provide alcohol to
other minors or commercial vendors who sell to minors may be liable).
203. See id. at 76-77 (stating that generally contributory negligence is a defense
to statutory breaches).
204. 533 N.W.2d 75 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
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Wagner noted that Minnesota does not allow a common law cause of ac-
tion against commercial vendors for the illegal sale of alcohol.2 5 It also
recognized that from 1977 to 1990, Minnesota social hosts were not liable
either by statute or common law for illegally furnishing alcohol to oth-206
ers. However, in VanWagner, the court of appeals reestablished a com-
mon law cause of action against social hosts who illegally serve alcohol to207
minors. The crux of the case concerned the applicability of Minne-208
sota's comparative fault provision in the subdivision six context. The
court of appeals held that the comparative fault statute applied and in-
ferred that it was not the legislature's intent to place a higher standard on




VanWagner answered the important question of who may recover in210
relation to subdivision six. The court allowed an intoxicated minor to
bring a claim for damages against a social host. 11 Unlike subdivision one• . z~12 . .
of the Civil Damages Act, subdivision six allows any party, not just inno-• 215
cent third parties, to bring an action. Furthermore, VanWagner infers
that the defense of contributory negligence is alive. 4 Since the court of
appeals held that the comparative fault statute is applicable to these
common law claims,215 contributory negligence is an obvious defense in
this context. However, other questions concerning subdivision six's scope
216
remain.
The legislature could further address the already recognized social
policy concern regarding innocent victims of alcohol-related torts by mak-
ing a simple, additional amendment to subdivision six. Subdivision six
currently states:
205. See id. at 77; see also Robinson v. Lamott, 289 N.W.2d 60, 65 (Minn. 1979)
(holding that an intoxicated person was barred from bringing a common law
cause of action against a commercial vendor).
206. See VanWagner, 533 N.W.2d at 77.
207. See id. at 80-81 (affirming the district court's ruling on the question of
comparative fault, but effectively allowing a common law claim for social host li-
ability to stand).
208. See id. at 77 (stating that the question is one of first impression for the
courts).
209. See id. at 80.
210. See id.
211. See generally VanWagner, 533 N.W.2d at 80 (holding that common law ac-
tions permitted by subdivision six of the Act are subject to comparative fault).
212. See MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 1 (1998).
213. See§ 340A.801, subd. 6.
214. See VanWagner, 533 N.W.2d at 80.
215. See id.
216. See supra notes 201-203 and accompanying text. Also, questions about
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[N]othing in this chapter precludes common law tort claims
against any person 21 years or older who knowingly provides or
furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person under the age of 21
217years.
To expand social host liability, the legislature could change two
small, yet important, sections of the current provision: "any person 21
years or older" could be replaced with "any person;" and "person under
the age of 21 years" could be replaced with "visibly intoxicated person."
While this proposal might spark criticism, it would be easily instituted
for two reasons. First, the current language of subdivision six is nearly
identical to this proposed amendment. Second, Minnesota courts are in-
218terpreting subdivision six's scope. Consequently, the transition for
courts, attorneys, and other interested parties to understand the breadth
of this proposed amendment's scope would be easier. Minnesota courts
could continue to interpret this proposed amendment consistently with
previous interpretations. That is, contributory negligence would still ap-
ply as a defense, and an intoxicated person could still bring a cause of ac-
tion against the host for negligently providing alcohol. Additionally,
courts should look to other states that have allowed common law claims
against social hosts for interpretations that extend beyond current subdi-
219vision six analyses.
The one major difference between subdivision six and the proposed
amendment's language is the element of "visible" intoxication. Al-
though Minnesota courts do not deal with this particular element in the
social host context, other states do. Indeed, Indiana and New Jersey are
two states whose dram shop laws involve the element of "visibly intoxi-221
cated" persons. Furthermore, Indiana allows common law negligence
222claims against social hosts irrespective of its dram shop law. Minnesota
217. See§ 340A.801, subd. 6.
218. See VanWagner, 533 N.W.2d at 80.
219. See Gariup Const. Co., Inc. v. Foster, 519 N.E.2d 1224, 1227-28 (Ind. 1988)
(stating that Indiana law requires judicial determination of a duty on the part of
the defendant to the plaintiff).
220. This author has suggested this element to place a higher burden on
plaintiffs suing social hosts. This heightened burden may preclude liability for
those social hosts who act responsibly.
221. See IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-5-10-15.5(a) (West 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2A:22A-1 to -7 (West 1987). See generally Thompson v. Ferdinand Sesquicentennial
Comm., Inc., 637 N.E.2d 178, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (stating a person may not
be held civilly liable under Indiana's Act for 'furnishing' an alcoholic beverage to
a person, including a minor, unless the person who furnishes the alcohol had ac-
tual knowledge that the person served was visibly intoxicated); Dower v. Gamba,
647 A.2d 1367 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (analyzing the applicability of New
Jersey's dram shop act).
222. See Gariup Const. Co., 519 N.E.2d at 1227-28.
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courts can look to these states' interpretations of common law claims as
well as the "visibly intoxicated" requirement of dram shop laws for defin-
ing its parameters. The transition of establishing an expansive amend-
ment for social host liability will be easier than most critics would allow.
Indeed, existing interpretations of subdivision six would provide guidance
for Minnesota courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The current trend regarding social host liability pursuant to dram
shop laws seems to be clear; notwithstanding the state of Utah, there is no
complete, statutory social host liability. Nonetheless, many states, includ-
ing Minnesota, recognize either common law claims, or allow statutory so-. 223
cial host liability claims on a very limited basis. The Koehnen case pre-
sented the Minnesota Supreme Court with another opportunity to visit the
issue of statutory social host liability. Unfortunately, the court's holding
remained consistent with the current trend in the United States; it re-
jected Minnesota's Civil Damages Act application to social hosts.
Despite numerous past amendments reacting to judicial interpreta-
tion, the legislature has remained silent on the issue of social host liability
since 1982. The Koehnen decision strays from the legislature's intent, and
thus it is necessary once again for the legislature to respond to case law.
By its holding, the Minnesota Supreme Court impliedly defined the
words "illegal sale" to apply only to commercial vendors, even though
what Rachel Paul did was to illegally sell alcohol. Furthermore, the court
narrowly defined "a person" to mean only a commercial vendor even
though the definition of "person" is unambiguously broader. Addition-
ally, the court chose not to address two relevant questions concerning the
Act. First, the court never defined a "social host." Perhaps more impor-
tantly, however, the court then discounted the true purpose of the Act,
and the genuine intent of the legislature, that is, to protect innocent third
parties.
Irrespective of whether the legislature changes the language of the
Civil Damages Act, the legislature has shown signs of progression toward
an expansion of social host liability and the Minnesota Supreme Court
should act accordingly. In addition to increasing the criminal penalty for
224
those that serve minors, the legislature has allowed a common law cause
of action against social hosts who serve minors. The policies behind these
common law suits are no different than those supporting social host liabil-
ity regardless of the age of the consumer. If states like Minnesota want to
continue to increase their effectiveness in reducing the number of alco-
hol-related deaths and injuries, an expansion of social host liability is cer-
223. See id.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 157-158.
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tainly a step in the right direction. The legislature must act accordingly,
and adopt a statute that provides for complete social host liability.
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